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Abstract
Submariners must balance mission imperatives with own ship safety and operational security. A prime measure of safety is 
avoiding collisions with other contacts, including fishing and other commercial vessels—and especially other submarines and 
warships. A current problem for submariners is maintaining the submarine’s manueverability when factors change, including the 
density of surrounding contacts, sea state, and weather/visibility, which impose constraints on the submarine’s manueverability.
These factors can also increase the submarine’s detectability if the situation requires longer or more frequent periscope views to 
maintain situation awareness. Having visualization tools that help submariners manage manueverability and detectability aids 
decision making by identifying recommended boundaries in the area of operation and recommended patterns of periscope 
operation. To provide the tools submariners need, we designed and developed several visual aids that identify recommended 
courses of action for various situations, which promotes greater awareness for future missions. These visual aids were formulated 
from a combination of Knowledge Elicitation (KE) sessions and cognitive task analysis with development of an abstraction 
hierarchy and a decision ladder. Our visual aids consist of mapping out a submariner’s area of operation by highlighting an 
optimized path the submariner can take when trying to avoid collisions. By having the ability to visualize these important factors 
and metrics that are involved in lowering a submarine’s detectability while still promoting safety helps increase a submariner’s 
awareness while also providing continuous improvement through risk management and mitigation for risky situations.
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1. Introduction
Within the Navy, maintaining a strong perception of one’s environmental surroundings is an essential component
that supports a submarine operator in balancing two main goals during a mission: 1) increasing safety by avoiding 
collision with surrounding contacts and 2) optimizing the submarine’s stealth by minimizing detectability to radar 
technologies. While avoiding collision and maintaining low detectability may seem very attainable for experienced 
submarine operators, it can be difficult to balance the outcomes of both of these goals when environmental factors 
are constantly changing. For example, a submarine may begin a mission predicting a specific sea-state which affects
visibility, thus making it difficult for a submarine operator to accurately identify surrounding contacts. However, the 
sea-state level makes it easier for the submarine to remain undetected to neighboring contacts on water, ground and 
airspace. A change in sea-state can make it easier for one goal to be achieved over another and exemplifies how the 
two mission goals conflict each other, making these goals an operational challenge to overcome.
There have been prime examples of when submarine operators have failed to maintain high situational awareness. 
In a 2012 training exercise, the San Jacinto cruiser collided with the submarine Montpelier resulting in over 80
million dollars in damage[1]. While the exercise was intended to be basic, the Montpelier’s watch standers failed to 
detect a 180-degree turn by the San Jacinto thinking it was moving further away from the submarine rather than
quickly approaching them. Reports claimed theMontpelierwas not following the standard submarine safety 
practices[1]. In 2001, there was another submarine collision due to lack of situational awareness that resulted in the 
sinking of a Japanese fishing vessel. The USS Greenville had set out giving a submarine tour to civilians and watch 
commanders were not fully aware of their surroundings given that the tour wasn’t an actual mission. They collided 
with a Japanese fishing vessel during the tour from not adequately performing contact analysis[2]. Out of 20 
crewmembers, only 11 survived the sinking of the Japanese fishing vessel[2] not to mention the millions of dollars 
spent on resurrecting damages. 
While there are differences between the two accidents mentioned above, both accidents failed to accurately track 
the actions of their surrounding contacts and lacked situational awareness. Collision accidents similar to that of the 
USS Montpelier and the USS Greenville may be prevented with better visualization tools that enable watch and 
sonar operators to quickly analyze unseen changes that occur in external situations during any event (i.e. unpredicted 
contact movement, sea-state status). In this paper, we present our process for the design of visualizations that enable 
submariners analyze their post-mission decisions regarding their course of actions (COAs) taken while optimizing
their safety and detectability. We start by detailing our analysis approach for understanding and modeling a
submariner’s domain. We then use this to explain our designs for the Commanding Officer’s Safe Operating
Environment(COSOE), visual, radar, and overall detectability. Finally, the conclusion touches on the future 
challenges and transition points for the development of our designs.
2. Design Approach
Our method for creating visualization to enhance contact management and detectability analytics was fueled from 
our previous work in designing a post-mission reconstruction tool to help submariners account for and analyze their 
actions taken over the course of a mission. This tool was built using a Work Domain Analysis (WDA) of submarine 
operations during and after a mission. Knowledge obtained from approximately 400 hours of knowledge elicitation 
(KE) was used to construct functional models that included an Abstraction Hierarchy and a Decision Ladder[3]. 
These artifacts mapped out work ecologies associated with methods currently used to track detectability on a 
submarine. They also allowed us to view gaps within current operational processes that occur during a submarine 
mission and highlighted critical areas of scope to include in reconstructing a mission[3].
After presenting a prototype of our mission reconstruction tool through current and retired submarine 
commanders as well as with our Office of Naval Research (ONR) Sponsor, we were guided towards implementing
advanced analytics to help submarine commanders reflect and support resilient planning for future mission tactics.
To provide these metrics effectively,we designed visualizations that were suitable to current submarine operator 
demands to prevent any additional cognitive demands and increased learning curves[4]. This was done by another 
round of extensive KE sessions from our subject matter expert (SME) Captain Wayne Thornton and literature 
reviews on correlations between the different factors that affect detectability (i.e. sea-state, periscope exposure, radar 
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technologies, etc.). This information was eventually used in the design of visualizations supporting the Commanding 
Officer’s Safe Operating Environment (COSOE) and the initial creation of Visual, Radar, and Overall detectability 
measures.
3. Commanding Officer’s Safe Operating Environment (COSOE)
The Commanding Officer’s Safe Operation Environment (COSOE) is an analytic toolthat helps submarine 
operators troubleshoot future movement decisions when they are surrounded by multiple contacts during a mission. 
When there are contacts present in a submarine’s mission path, quick decisions are made to maneuver to certain 
areas to avoid collision ultimately affecting a submarine’s future acceptable area of maneuverability. We visualized 
this concept by providing a highlighted COSOE path on our geospatial map view and also provided metrics on a 
submarine’s predicted Closest Point of Approach (CPA) (shown inFigure 1) of surrounding contacts. The Closest 
Point of Approach is calculated using vectors in the x-y coordinates[5] taken from the geospatial view. During the 
mission, this information is recorded contact status is updated and recorded. Having this COSOE support increases 
the situational awareness by displaying an area limit that the submarine should stay within to prevent collision while 
not veering far off their planned mission path. Yellow vectors are added to contacts to give an indication of their 
direction and speed via the length and direction of the vectors.
Fig. 1.Geospatial map view showing the submarine in the blue dot. Surrounding contact are shown in green and yellow dots that signify their 
approximate distance to the submarine. The COSOE is shown by the translucent gray triangle. The Moveable Range within COSOE is the orange 
triangle recommending the submariner of an acceptable path to follow..
To supplement the COSOE analysis we wanted to provide further analytical reasoning to show the submariner 
where they can maneuver within the COSOE support. We added a Moveable Range within the COSOE 
visualization, shown by the orange triangle inFigure 1. This is used if the crew has made any decisions that lowered 
future maneuverability and helps crewmembers identify and analyze instances where they may have restricted their 
future movement. The Moveable Range within COSOE helps to identify tradeoffs that may have occurred during 
the mission (e.g. areas where the maneuverable range was restricted, but there was no other choice due to erratic 
behavior from contacts). Since these contact management elements are shown in the mission reconstruction tool, it 
enables a crew to improve their situational awareness performance for future missions rather than relying solely on 
remembering the outcomes from decisions made in past missions.
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4. Visualizing Detectability
There are several factors (i.e. amount of wake, sea-state, and closeness of contacts) that affect how detectable a 
submarine is. Having a lowered detectability compromises the submarine’s stealth to contacts that may be hostile 
threats in a high-risk mission. In our previous work we focused on visualizing areas where the periscope may be at a 
higher vulnerability and more likely detected by neighboring ships’ radar technologies. These areas identified the 
ship’s speed (which correlates to the amount of wake generated from the submarine), change of thermal temperature 
of the periscope, times when the periscope remained above sea surface too long, and fog or visibility information 
throughout the mission [3]. Our current work has been on incorporating these detectability factors into a 
representation that coherently measures the crewmembers visual detectability performance. Figure 2shows our 
design of an ecological interface that tracks the submarine speed and periscope time above sea surface with regards 
to the estimated sea-state. Previous literature states that different sea-states can be represented on a set of 
logarithmic scales[6]. An operator selects a preferred periscope height on the horizontal axis. The periscope height 
corresponds to the given sea-state and gives a recommendation to the appropriate submarine speed and periscope 
exposure time. A speed barrier is also shown that tracks the submarine speed while the periscope is above surface. 
This tool allows submariner to pinpoint areas where they may have lacked on their detectability performance and it 
also helps them validate any actions that may have been taken that compromised their detectability during the 
mission.
Fig. 2.The Visual Detectability tracker maps the chosen periscope height with the mission sea-state and tracks the periscope exposure time and 
submarine speed over the mission.
Estimating radar and IR detectability is difficult, especially with how quickly new technologies are developed 
and implemented in not only ships but also contacts that occupy the ground and airspace. Current technologies have 
the ability to pick up signals from as far as 20 miles away[7]. Since many radar and IR technologies really heavily 
on distance, we have created a visualization that assesses the amount of contacts in acceptable radar ranges 
throughout the entire mission. This visualization (Figure 3, left) is based on the theory that the closer contacts are to 
the submarine the more likely they are detected by radar technologies. The bulls-eye visualization displays the 
number of contacts within different distance thresholds and color is used to distinguish the severity of the distance.A 
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red outline appears around a range in the bulls-eye when radar and IR detectability is highly compromised (i.e. a 
sudden increase of close contacts). The number of contacts in each threshold is displayed in the chart on the right 
enabling a submarine operator to quickly distinguish times during the mission where they lacked in radar 
detectability performance. The color of the bars also correspond to the range colors in the bulls-eye and also turn red 
when the red outline appears on the bulls-eye. The radar detectability visualization can also be tied into our past 
work with contact management and future work will be done to enhance the analytics provided between radar and 
neighboring contacts.
Fig. 3.Radar Detectability tracker that shows a bull-eye view of contacts within radar threshold distances (left) and shows a bar chart 
representation of the number of contacts in each of these thresholds (right).
We have also started to design a way to combine visual and radar detectability into a single quantitative 
performance measure that signifies how well submariners executed on their detectability performance. This metric 
may have the ability to be included within our reporting feature which is also located within the reconstruction tool. 
This overalldetectability metric (Figure 4) design attempts to separate the two elements of detectability (i.e. visual 
and radar) into simplified metrics that correlate with our past work on contact management and detectability. The 
Visual element tracks the number of times the periscope was up too long and information is pulled from the Visual 
Detectability Chart (Figure 2). The Radar element lists the average number of contacts within 5000 yards during the 
mission and is calculated from Radar and IR Detectability Chart (Figure 3). In future work, we will continue 
iterating on these initial designs to validate and create additional metrics that may be suitable and helpful for 
submarine operators to review and advance their decision making in emerging submarine missions.
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Fig. 4.Overall Detectability tracker that displays a submarine operator’s detectability performance over the mission in regards to both visual and 
radar detectability components.
5. Future Work and Conclusions
While the ability to provide post-mission analytics with regards to contact management and detectability 
revolutionary in concept, there is still a large amount of work to be done for the development of visualizations. 
Future work will include extensive iteration on our current designs before we implement them into our
reconstruction tool. The iterations will be focused on providing additional analytics that are relevant to user needs. 
The design of the current visualizations will also be iterated to ensure usability and relevance to other elements in 
our current reconstruction tool. For example, we are currently integrating text based help messages through rule 
chaining methods that give some indication of why certain issues occurred during the mission. This may provide an 
easier and faster post-mission analysis for submarine commanders.After developing our designs into our software 
we will conduct user testing with current submarine operators to validate the usability and relevance of these 
visualizations along with the rest of our reconstruction tool components.
With this further development and input added from operational users, we believe that the use of visualizing 
essential submarine mission metrics can add resilience to future submarine missions in several ways.By visualizing 
relevant mission data, submarine operators can use post-mission reconstruction as a tool to help them recognize and
remember specific situations, actions taken, and outcomes that occurred from their actions. This additional analysis 
may not only prevent collision catastrophes like the USS Greenville and USS Montpelier from occurring,but may 
have the ability to improve the quality and accuracy of judgements made in a constantly changing environment by 
influencing submarine commander and operator’s future decisions with past mission data.
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